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IP as Conflict Resolution:                         
A Micro View of IP
SOLVEIG SINGLETON* 
If one pokes at free speech rights with a sharp analytical and historical 
stick, he or she may be surprised by how much free speech rights depend 
on and are defined by property rights.1  My right to deliver a political 
speech does not mean that I have a right to break into your house and 
deliver it in your living room.  Free speech rights have boundaries, and 
property rights often decide where these boundaries are.  (Some of the 
harder free speech cases involve cases where property boundaries are 
blurred, for example, in public forums or on the public airwaves.)  In any 
case, one does not hear much about the potential conflict between 
trespass law and free speech, but one does hear concerns about a conflict 
between intellectual property (IP) and free speech.  This is the problem 
that Richard Epstein’s paper entitled Liberty versus Property: Understanding 
the Foundations of Copyright Law addresses.2
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 1. See generally John O. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision 
of the First Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49 (1996) (describing the historic origin of 
free speech rights in property rights).  See also Solveig Singleton, Reviving a First 
Amendment Absolutism for the Internet, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 279, 313–15 (1999) 
(discussing property issues implicated in Hugo Black’s First Amendment doctrine). 
 2. Richard Epstein, Liberty versus Property: Cracks in the Foundations of 
Copyright Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 3 (2005) (“[T]his Article . . . is an examination of 
the tension between liberty and property within the natural law tradition of Locke . . . .  
[It also examines] how the same tension between liberty and property plays out in 




The question is whether the difference between IP and physical 
property is such that we must be concerned about a conflict between free 
speech and IP in a way we need not be concerned about a conflict 
between free speech and trespass.  Professor Epstein’s answer is that IP 
is different from physical property, but not that different.3  Both IP and 
physical property rules exist because they are useful in channeling 
incentives.  There will, however, be differences in how particular conflicts 
between liberty and property ought to be resolved, depending on the 
nature of the tangible or intangible resource, some of which Professor 
Epstein explores.4  This Article defends Professor Epstein’s basic argument, 
that IP and physical property are essentially linked, and further explores 
how the linkage relates to some obvious differences between the legal 
regimes for tangible and intangible property. 
I.  THE ROOTS OF PHYSICAL PROPERTY: PRACTICAL                            
RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
When analyzing physical property, Professor Epstein starts from the 
premise that there is no self-evident or a priori justification for the 
institution.5  At several points in the argument we need to go back to 
utilitarian arguments, thinking about the kinds of rules and incentives 
needed to encourage the creation of new wealth.  Another thread in his 
argument is that we need rules that make sense as a system of resource 
allocation, in the sense of providing a useful answer to the question of 
who is entitled to what.6
connection with copyright . . . .”) [hereinafter Epstein, Liberty versus Property]. 
 3. Id. at 4 (“In the end, it is largely proper to yoke together liberty and 
property . . . .”); see also id.: 
[T]he gulf between property rights in tangibles and property rights in 
intangibles is far narrower than these theorists believe.  The set of justifications 
used in the former carries over to the latter.  The only question that remains is 
how the differences in the nature of the resources in question, whether copyright or 
patent . . . require a distinctive configuration of property rights in the appropriate 
area. . . .  Intellectual property rights rest on some plausible but not infallible 
assumptions, but so too do property rights in land and water. 
 4. Id. at 25–26. 
 5. See id. at 5–6; see also id. at 28 (“[M]y own private campaign has been to 
insist that the strength of the natural law theories rested on their implicit utilitarian 
(broadly conceived) foundations, which require some empirical evaluation of why given 
institutions promote human flourishing and through it general social welfare.”). 
 6. See id. at 7 (“[I]f I do not deserve the fruits of my labor . . . then who 
does? . . . .  [C]ritics leave completely undetermined just who should get the benefit of 
all the elements that are thought in combination to be insufficient to justify a claim on 
desert . . . .”); see also id. at 9 (“[T]he effort to isolate proportionate contributions from 
luck and from effort falls apart because of the inability to conduct sensible measurements 
over countless individuals for countless periods.”). 
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This latter thread about the need for rules to serve as a practicable 
basis for resource allocation turns out to be tremendously important; it 
ties in directly to the day-to-day function of property rules in conflict 
resolution.  Historically, it was doubtful that there was a Philosopher 
King (or Economist King) looking down on property rights from above 
and saying: “We need property rights to create incentives.”  If we stay 
tuned into what we know about the history of property law, the rules 
evolved in case-by-case deliberations.7  In individual cases, it is the 
micro-focus emphasis on conflict resolution that dominates, i.e., individuals 
involved in resolving conflicts over actual pieces of property.  On a day-
to-day basis, authorities (such as they were) would have been largely 
concerned with what happens when A snatched an apple out of B’s hand 
and B clobbered A over the head with a stick.8  And this thread of 
conflict resolution turns out to be important in IP, too, as discussed 
further below. 
In discussing physical property, Professor Epstein is right to set aside 
idealistic considerations of whether the owners of property deserve their 
right in it.9  This will strike a lot of people as counter-intuitive, as divorcing 
ethics and justice too far.  Nevertheless, it is right.  The economist F.A. 
Hayek explains why we cannot worry about establishing perfect fairness 
or individual merit when it comes to making law.10  First, we need a 
system of rules that rewards results, not intentions.  This planet can be a 
harsh environment for human beings.  We need to produce food and 
 7. See HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY 
HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 7–8 (Beacon Press 1963) 
(1861) (describing how judgments preceded legislators or even principles in ancient law). 
 8. This view of the evolution of law is recognized today in game theoretic 
discussions of how legal principles may have evolved in individual encounters.  See, e.g., 
ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).  See generally Robert 
Axelrod, An Evolutionary Approach to Norms, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1095 (1986); 
Jason Alexander & Brian Skyrms, Bargaining with Neighbors: Is Justice Contagious?, 
96 J. PHIL. 588 (1999); Ken Binmore and Larry Samuelson, An Economist’s Perspective 
on the Evolution of Norms, 150 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 45 (1994); 
Peter Vanderschraaf, Game Theory, Evolution, and Justice, 28 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 325 
(2000). 
 9. Epstein, Liberty versus Property, supra note 2, at 5–7. 
 10. F.A. HAYEK, 2 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL 
JUSTICE 72 (1976): 
[T]o hold out a sufficient incentive for those movements which are required to 
maintain a market order, it will often be necessary that the return of people’s 
effort do not correspond to recognizable merit . . . .  It is not good intentions or 
needs but doing what in fact most benefits others, irrespective of motive, 
which will secure the best reward. 




shelter and other goods, and so we want to reward those who actually 
produce those goods, whether they do so by luck or something else.  
Second, this planet, and human life on it, is inherently unfair by a pure 
egalitarian standard.  Some are born into good families, some into bad, 
some into rich lands, and some into poor.  To eradicate this unfairness 
would require a level of totalitarian control over human life that would 
put to shame anything attempted by the former Soviet Union.11  Law is 
good at giving us rough and ready rules for when A hits B with a club, 
but it cannot establish perfection. 
II.  IP AS CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
In moving on to discuss intellectual property, Professor Epstein notes 
that the process of making IP is statutory and therefore it is top-down,12 
not bottom-up “found law” in the sense that common law or other law 
built on cases or customs is.13  But the result is defensible for similar 
reasons—because it is needed to make us all better off by putting in 
place incentives to create.  I agree with this argument. 
However, notice that the earlier concern about practical conflict 
resolution has fallen out of the debate.  Returning to this concern and 
thinking about IP and the needs of a system of conflict resolution, we 
again stumble across a difference between IP and physical property.  The 
threat of a breach of the peace that one gets if one grabs an apple out of 
someone’s hand is simply not as immediate if one copies some Macintosh 
software and leaves him with his own copy, especially if one does so 
over a wire, remote from him in time and space.  Therefore, the argument 
about incentives is roughly the same for physical property and IP at the 
macro level, but the problem of conflict resolution is different at the 
micro level—not a difference of kind, but of degree. 
This helps explain why many ordinary people—college students and 
Grokster fans of all stripes—just feel differently about IP than they do 
about stealing physical property.  And the law recognizes this difference 
as well in the penalties for copyright.  Historically, policing costs have 
been borne by the copyright owner, not by the publicly funded police 
and prosecutors brought to bear against more obvious and immediately 
dangerous breaches of the peace.  Penalties for copyright were mostly 
civil, with criminal violations much less emphasized.14
 11. Id. at 84–85 (“To achieve [real equality of opportunity] this government would 
have to control the whole physical and human environment of all persons . . . .”). 
 12. Epstein, Liberty versus Property, supra note 2, at 20. 
 13. BRUNO LEONI, FREEDOM AND THE LAW 11, 21–22 (3d ed. 1991). 
 14. See generally Note, The Criminalization of Copyright Infringement in the 
Digital Era, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1705 (1999).
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It should be noted that this difference in the way IP functions as 
conflict resolution is a difference of degree, not of kind.  It is so because 
there is a danger that IP will ultimately result in breaches of the peace as 
wasteful as people hitting each other over the head with clubs.  Things 
could get nasty, with viruses embedded in MP3 files and endless wars 
between hackers and coders; though this might yield a flood of 
innovation, this is far from clear, some of the resources thus expended 
might be better directed elsewhere.  Therefore, it is important to return to 
a consensus on ground rules here. 
However, it is easier said than done—it is not likely that many 
ordinary people will suddenly start worrying in the abstract about 
incentives.  One attempt to get people to think about copyright the way they 
do about theft has been through deterrence by increasing the penalties 
for copyright infringement, introducing more criminal penalties, and so 
on.15  This is probably a mistake for two reasons.  First, empirical research 
on deterrence shows that it has more to do with the frequency of 
enforcement than the severity of penalties.  A law that is enforced only 
in a few token cases with severe penalties is a much less effective 
deterrent than a law with a light penalty that is consistently enforced.16  
Consequently, the direction that should be followed is towards more 
consistent enforcement, not higher penalties. 
Second, increasing penalties for copyright infringement to the point 
where college students are threatened with being tossed into prison for 
several years will strike most people as grossly unfair.  And it will only 
further undermine the consensus in favor of copyright. 
 15. Id.
 16. Empirical evidence shows that increasingly severe punishment is a less 
effective deterrent than increasing the probability the violator will be caught.  See 
SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES (6th 
ed. 1995); Ann Dryden Witte, Economic Theories, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND 
JUSTICE 316, 322 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983).  Studies of individual level tax 
compliance have also found that the severity of the penalty is less of a deterrent than the 
probability of detection.  Dick J. Hessing et al., Does Deterrence Deter? Measuring the 
Effect of Deterrence on Tax Compliance in Field Studies and Experimental Studies, in 
WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 291, 291–92 (Joel 
Slemrod ed., 1992); see also Brian Erard, The Influence of Tax Audits on Reporting 
Behavior, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES, supra, at 95, 107, 113.  These studies suggest that 
the weight of a sanction only becomes relevant after the likelihood of being caught 
becomes substantial. 




III.  SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF POSITIVISM WITH EXPECTATIONS:                    
IP AND PHYSICAL PROPERTY 
Professor Epstein shows that ordinary physical property and IP are 
basically useful man-made creatures.17  This leads us to a problem that 
Professor Epstein has discussed at length elsewhere.18  If these rules are 
made by man, why can’t they be broken and remade by man?  That is, if 
we show that IP is like physical property and vice versa using utilitarian 
arguments, haven’t we just shown that legislatures, as today’s spokespersons 
for society, can remake them at will?  Wouldn’t this be especially true 
for IP, which Professor Epstein points out has a more obviously top-
down component than physical property?19
I think not.  To explain why not, I will attempt a sports analogy.  Consider 
a game of basketball.  Halfway through the game the referees or some other 
authority decide to move the basket a few inches higher, or to the left, or 
to change the application of some other rule to the game.  Both the players 
and the fans would likely be furious and baffled.  It does not matter to 
them where the rules came from, or whether or not the rules could 
originally have been different in some respect.  What matters is that their 
expectations—their plans and practices—have settled around the rules 
they were originally given.  If the rules are changed, it should only be for 
a very good reason. 
For IP, or basketball, or physical property, what the ground rules are 
matters because people’s expectations matter.  We count on rules to 
make our uncertain future as human beings a little less uncertain.  Even 
with top-down statutory rules, what ultimately matters about the rules is 
the role they play in people’s lives. 
Therefore, with IP, as with physical property or with a game of 
basketball, we can have a meaningful conversation about fairness when 
the rules are interpreted differently or changed.20  Italian legal scholar 
Bruno Leoni, another big advocate of bottom-up rules and legal certainty, 
thought that at bottom our sense of what is fair and right stem from well-
 17. See generally Epstein, Liberty versus Property, supra note 2. 
 18. Richard A. Epstein, The Dubious Constitutionality of the Copyright Term 
Extension Act, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 123, 157 (2003) [hereinafter Epstein, Dubious 
Constitutionality]. 
 19. Epstein, Liberty versus Property, supra note 2, at 20. 
 20. Note that this argument is not intended to supply or supplant the much more 
specific constitutional inquiries and tests that are brought to bear in considering whether 
any particular law or practice is unconstitutional; one must have something more specific 
to base such determinations on than general expectations.  The argument about 
expectations is simply intended to explain how man-made rules, top-down or bottom-up, 
acquire normative force even if they originally included some arbitrary element. 
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established expectations, which he referred to as “previsions.”21
But here again we stumble across another interesting bit of history that 
has recently split IP and physical property apart on the surface.  Technology 
has made IP increasingly hard to enforce and easy to break, and the 
practice of routine copying has confused people’s expectations of what 
is fair and right.  Once expectations get off on the wrong foot, it can 
be dreadfully difficult to get them back on the right track again.  One 
almost has to start at the beginning all over again and hope for some 
kind of “constitutional moment.”  This is probably what needs to happen 
for IP.  But it will not be a smooth process, and the name calling we 
have seen so far in the debate will not help. 
IV.  WHAT IS THE PUBLIC DOMAIN? 
Let us explore one final implication of this emphasis on micro conflict 
resolution for the issue of the conflict between copyright and liberty.  
Suppose the legislature changes the copyright law, for example, by 
extending the length of already existing copyrights for a period of years.  
Professor Epstein has argued that this is a First Amendment violation,22 
just as the change to the boundaries of physical property law by regulation 
would constitute a taking.  The theory is that one cannot give to some 
without taking from others.  In the case of IP, the possession of others is 
the public domain.  In his paper, Professor Epstein invokes public trust 
law, and notes that the state ought to be reimbursed for intrusions on the 
public trust.23  Do we want to treat the public domain as a public trust? 
But I think that treating the public domain as a possession of others is 
also a pretty dubious proposition.  Professor Epstein’s own point that 
property must function as a practical system of resource allocation, and 
that too many competing claims prevent this, is relevant here. In a 
Lockean tradition, we do not want to be arguing that when someone 
takes a handful of nuts from the commons, the nuts were, prior to the 
taking, owned in some sense by everyone.  It is much cleaner and causes 
fewer problems (and I think is more historically realistic) to treat the 
nuts as being owned by no one.  One might ask if it does not make a 
great deal of sense to treat the public domain in copyright the same 
 21. LEONI, supra note 13, at 198. 
 22. Epstein, Dubious Constitutionality, supra note 18, at 157.
 23. Epstein, Liberty versus Property, supra note 2, at 27–28; see also Epstein, 
Dubious Constitutionality, supra note 18, at 156–58. 
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way—not as information owned by everyone, but as information owned 
by no one.  Treating it as property owned by everyone just does not 
seem to make for a sensible system of conflict resolution—there are too 
many potentially competing claims. 
One counter-argument might be that the First Amendment boosts 
information up into something like property owned by everyone.  But I 
do not think we want it to be treated like a public trust administered by 
the state. If the last survivor of a key battle is hit by a truck on the way to 
talk to a historian, should the state sue the truck driver for the resulting 
loss to the public trust?  Probably not. 
Therefore, I do not think we need to treat the public domain as anything 
like common property to throw up a red flag when the legislature messes 
with it.  But this is simply because ordinary people’s expectations matter, 
the way they matter in the basketball example above. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Professor Epstein is correct in that both physical property and IP are 
about incentives, though they have different origins (as far as we know).  
Here are some differences in the way the two systems function as 
systems of conflict resolution, but those are differences of degree and 
technology, not differences as to their fundamental nature. 
So it does not make much more sense to speak of a conflict between 
free speech and IP at a fundamental level, than of a conflict between free 
speech and the law of trespass, if you toss a would-be speaker out of 
your living room or edit a column in your newspaper.  There can be 
conflicts between IP legislation and the First Amendment, just as there 
can be conflicts between property law or regulation and the Takings 
Clause.  Once the rules are in place, people should be able to rely on 
them as a practical matter so fundamental that it becomes normative. 
In practice, our expectations about IP enforcement at the micro level 
have become divorced from the theory that justifies IP as a system of 
incentives at the macro level.  Those notions have to be two sides of the 
same coin, as they tend to be with physical property, or they will cause 
conflict rather than resolve it.  This problem desperately needs to be 
resolved with IP, and the name calling that we have seen so far in the 
debate will not resolve it.  What we need is a new appreciation of why 
incentive systems matter.  Perhaps this conclusion is too theoretical for 
the average downloading college student, but if so, we are going to have 
bigger problems than just the erosion of IP.  We might be looking at the 
erosion of property rights across the board.  If some of the college 
campus rhetoric about globalism, environmentalism, trade, and other 
similar issues is any guide, that is just what we are seeing. 
